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One of the most controversial issues in American law in recent
decades has been the proper response of an attorney when faced with a
client intending to commit perjury at trial. Professor Monroe Freedman
sparked a particularly heated debate with his article, ProfessionalResponsibility of the CriminalDefense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions.' In this article, Professor Freedman argued that while a criminal
defense attorney must try to persuade her client not to commit perjury,
she must nevertheless allow her client to testify falsely with full assistance of counsel if the client insists on testifying.' Professor Freedman's
article met with a stiff rejoinder from then Professor, now Judge, John
Noonan, who argued that a defense attorney has an affirmative obligation to prevent the perpetration of fraud upon the court, and that this
duty transcends any duty to a client wishing to improve her chances
through perjured testimony.' The battle over the appropriate role of the
lawyer in client perjury settings has raged ever since among commentators,4 in the courts,5 and within the organized bar.6
t Shareholder, Dickinson, Throckmorton, Parker, Mannheimer & Raife, a Professional Corporation, Des Moines, Iowa. B.A. 1973, M.A. 1973, Stanford University;
J.D. 1977, University of California at Berkeley.
Before entering private practice, the author was Deputy Attorney General for the
State of Iowa, 1983-86, during which time he served as counsel before the Supreme
Court in Nix v. Whiteside.
1 Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966).
2 See id. at 1475-1480.
3 See Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64
MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966).
4 Compare Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1031, 1052-57 (1975) (emphasizing the truth-seeking function of the judicial system) and Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 868-70 (same) with Callan & David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure
of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUrGERS L. REV. 332, 395-96
(1976) (arguing that the adversary system requires restricted disclosure of client perjury) and Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060
(1975) (same).
I Compare Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1328-33 reh'g en banc denied,
750 F.2d 713, 714 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157
(1986) (defense counsel's threats to withdraw and testify against defendant if defendant
committed perjury violated defendant's constitutional rights) and Lowery v. Cardwell,
575 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1978) (counsel's efforts to withdraw on suspicion of client
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A number of lower courts struggled with the client perjury problem in the 1970s and 1980s but failed to produce either consistent approaches or similar results. 7 The Supreme Court remained above the
fray until it granted review in the case of Nix v. Whiteside.8 In Whiteside, a defense attorney had persuaded his client not to present testimony that the attorney believed would be false. The attorney accomplished this result by delivering a forceful admonition to his client that
included a warning that he might be allowed to impeach any untruthful testimony offered by the client if the client insisted on taking the
stand and offering false testimony. While the Supreme Court of Iowa9
and the federal district court10 found the lawyer's approach constitutionally acceptable, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
defendant's constitutional rights had been violated."'
When the Supreme Court granted review, 2 observers both hoped
and feared that the high court would federalize the approach to the
attorney-client perjury dilemma through constitutional adjudication.
The Court did nothing of the kind. Instead, it simply held that, given
the facts of the case, the Constitution did not prevent Iowa from imposing criminal sanctions against Whiteside. The unusual factual posture
of the case and the narrow character of the Court's actual holding
were, however, masked by sweeping statements in the majority opinion
on legal ethics. A number of lower courts have assumed erroneously
that dicta on ethical issues in Whiteside has a constitutional
dimension.'

3

perjury violated client's constitutional rights) and United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 120-22 (3d Cir. 1977) (judge's ruling that counsel could withdraw

if defendant took the stand impermissibly required that the defendant choose between
his right to counsel and his right to testify, even though counsel's threat to withdraw
was motivated by the conviction that defendant would commit perjury) with United
States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1073-75 (7th Cir. 1984) (when apparent that defend-

ant would testify perjuriously, failure to put him on the stand did not violate constitutional rights) and McKissick v. United States, 398 F.2d 342, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1968)

(counsel is ethically compelled to reveal perjury to the court).
e See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
7 See supra note 5.
8 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1978).
10 Whiteside v. Scurr, Civ. No. 81-246-C, slip. op. at 2-3 (S.D. Iowa Dec. 7,
1982).

" Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1328-31 (8th Cir.) reh'g en banc denied,
750 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).

Whiteside, 471 U.S. 1014 (1986).
Courts have reached this conclusion despite the concurring Justices' clear emphasis on the narrowness of the case's holding. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 177
(1986) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., concurring in
the judgment); id. at 176-77 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the
Court's treatment of legal ethics is "pure discourse without force of law," and that
12
's
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The purpose of this Article is to bring the actual holding of Nix v.
Whiteside into focus and to ensure that the debate over the proper response of an attorney to client perjury distinguishes between ethical and
constitutional precepts. Part I canvasses the ethical and constitutional
issues inherent in the client perjury dilemma, emphasizing that the various state ethical rules governing the conduct of licensed attorneys are
primarily rooted in state law, not federal constitutional law. Part II
analyzes Whiteside, giving special emphasis to the limited character of
its constitutional holding. It observes that, at least under the facts
presented in Whiteside, the constitutional provisions arguably relevant
to the client perjury dilemma do not mandate any particular ethical
approach, but instead allow the states broad leeway to determine their
own solutions to the problem. Finally, Part III discusses the impact
Whiteside has had on subsequent judicial decisions and on the relationship between criminal defense attorneys and their clients.
I.

ETHICAL VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

In order to understand the practical and theoretical importance of
Nix v. Whiteside,14 it is important initially to distinguish between its
ethical and constitutional principles. Failure to recognize this critical
difference leads to imprecise analysis that allows judges and commentators to cloak ethical policy preferences in constitutional garb.
The focal point of legal ethics is attorney conduct. Principles of
legal ethics, as embraced in various state codes of professional responsibility, are designed to govern the conduct of lawyers, which the state
regulates through the licensing process. The proper behavior of licensed
attorneys in the conduct of their profession is thus a matter of state law.
By contrast, the focus of constitutional analysis is not attorney conduct so much as the circumstances under which a state may impose
criminal sanctions against an individual. A constitutional tribunal does
not sit to discipline an attorney, but rather rather to consider the validity of state action against the attorney's client. While constitutional limitations may restrict a state's freedom to make policy choices regarding
the ethical rules it expects lawyers to observe in their professional conduct, the Constitution gives the federal judiciary no authority to establish comprehensive ethical rules applicable in state criminal
proceedings.
Because of this legal/ethical distinction, it is entirely possible that
"[llawyers, judges, bar associations, students, and others should understand that the
problem has not now been 'decided.' "); infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
14

475 U.S. 157 (1986).

1916

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 136:1913

local rules of ethics may require a lawyer to act in a way that renders a
trial process constitutionally defective. Conversely, the mere fact that a
lawyer violates a local ethical rule while representing a criminal defendant does not necessarily taint a subsequent conviction.
A.

Models of Ethical Professional Conduct

The literature recognizes two contrasting models of the attorneyclient relationship. When regulating the attorney response to client perjury, a state may choose to be guided by one of the two most prominent
theoretical models of attorney conduct. The first model, endorsed by
Judge Noonan, 5 has been referred to as the "officer of the court"
model."8 Under this model, a lawyer has obligations to the courts and
the judicial system that transcend client representation. The officer of
the court model imposes a duty upon the lawyer to take all steps necessary to prevent perjury from occurring; if it has occurred, the lawyer
must take steps to negate its effect.
Advocates of the officer of the court model argue that mandatory
disclosure is required to preserve the integrity of courts of law and the
legal profession. 17 According to this view, unless lawyers are bound by
affirmative duties to the courts, the practice of law would degenerate
into guerilla warfare, in which no rules would be mandatory and the
falsification of evidence would be commonplace. Public confidence in
the judicial system would erode, thereby encouraging self-help remedies
and undermining effective and consistent civil and criminal law
enforcement."8
The second model, sometimes referred to as the "alter ego"
model, 19 emphasizes the need for strict confidentiality in the attorneyclient relationship. Under this strict confidentiality approach, a lawyer
should give undivided loyalty to her client, short of breaking the law.
Although a lawyer may not induce or incite false testimony, her only
responsibility when faced with a client who intends to offer perjured
testimony is to explain to the client that perjury is a crime, and to
discourage false testimony with an appeal to the client to abide by the
law. If the client insists on committing perjury, however, the lawyer's
15 See Noonan, supra note 3, at 1492.
IS See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 27
(1975) ("The attorney, we are told, is an officer of the court . . ").
1" The policy arguments regarding the proper approach to client perjury will not
be repeated in full, as they have been exhaustively discussed elsewhere, for example in
those sources listed supra note 4.
18 See Wolfram, supra note 4, at 835-6.
19

1980).

See, e.g.,

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE

§ 4.11 commentary (2d ed.
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duty is simply to continue representing the client in the normal
20
course.
Those who advocate strict confidentiality generally stress the delicate nature of the attorney-client relationship.2 1 Many criminal defendants are socially alienated individuals who have no confidence in the
system of criminal justice. Some defendants may fear that their attorneys, particularly court-appointed attorneys, are simply agents of the
state whose main function, given the inevitability of conviction, is simply to put on an empty show of due process. Lawyers must be able to
insure their clients absolute confidentiality, so the argument goes, if
they are to have any realistic prospects of breaking down barriers of
fear and establishing the kind of working relationship necessary for an
effective defense.
B.

Codes of ProfessionalResponsibility
1. Canons of Professional Ethics

The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Canons of Professional
Ethics (1908) was the first formal code of professional responsibility
developed by the legal profession in this country. 2 The Canons did not
provide clear guidance as to the proper role of an attorney when faced
with a client intent on perjuring herself in an upcoming criminal trial.
On the one hand, the lawyer is admonished in Canons 15, 22, 29, 32
and 42: a) to refuse to engage in any activity on behalf of a client that
involves "violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicane"; 23 (b) to
conduct her activities with "candor and fairness"; 2 ' c) to bring any perjury that has occurred to the attention of prosecuting authorities;2 5 d) to
refuse to render any service on behalf of any client or cause "involving
disloyalty to the law";' and e) to "promptly inform the injured person
or his counsel" if a fraud is perpetrated by a client.27 On the other
hand, Canon 6 directs a lawyer to represent a client "with undivided
fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences." 28
The Canon 6 confidentiality provision is qualified, however, by
Canon 37, which states that "[tihe announced intention of a client to
'0 See Freedman, supra note 1, at 1475-78.
21 See id. at 1473-74.
22 CANONS OF PROFESSIONAl. ETHICS (1967).
22 Id. Canon 15.
24 Id. Canon 22.
25 See id. Canon 29.
26 Id. Canon 32.
2 Id. Canon 42.
28 Id. Canon 6.
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commit a crime is not included within the confidences which he is
bound to respect." 2 This provision, does not necessarily require that an
attorney take affirmative steps to prevent a client from committing perjury in a criminal trial, particularly when to do so would result in
explicit or implicit disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications. Canon 37 arguably gives the attorney the option of disclosing the
intended client perjury, or keeping it confidential. Under this interpretation, the attorney's response would depend on the facts of the case,
potential prejudice to the client, and the philosophy of the attorney.
Faced with such a discretionary choice, the less risky alternative
for an attorney would be to preserve the client's confidence or secret,
thereby eliminating the possibility of external review of the attorney's
judgment entailed by disclosure. As one commentator has noted, discretionary remedies amount to "a luxury made available to the morally
scrupulous at their own risk."' In addition, by not disclosing, a lawyer
avoids a potentially uncomfortable conflict with her client, a situation
that most attorneys understandably would rather not confront. For all
practical purposes, a discretionary disclosure rule tends to result in the
preservation of client confidences and secrets.
The Canons' ambiguous approach to client perjury was considered
by the ABA in Formal Opinion 287, issued in 1953.31 While the Opin-

ion does not address the question of what an attorney should do when
faced with a client intent on committing perjury at an upcoming trial, it
does consider the proper response of an attorney when, at the time of
sentencing, a client makes a false statement to the court about his criminal record. When the lawyer's knowledge of her client's false itatement
is derived from client confidences, the Opinion states that the attorney
should remonstrate with the client, and withdraw if the situation is not
rectified. The lawyer should not, however, violate the client's confidence through disclosure if the client refuses to take appropriate corrective action. If the lawyer knows from sources other than client communications-for instance, from her own independent investigation-that
her client's statements are false, the Opinion holds that disclosure is
then required.3 2
29 Id.

Canon 37.

Fried, Too High a Pricefor the Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilegefor Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C.L. REV. 443, 495 (1986).
"' ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 287 (1953).
32

See id.
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Model Code of Professional Responsibility

The ABA promulgated its Model Code of Professional Responsibility33 to replace the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1969. The principle of attorney-client confidentiality is embraced in DR 4-101, which
states that, subject to certain exceptions, an attorney shall not knowingly reveal a "confidence" or "secret" of the client."' The Code defines
"confidence" as "information protected by the attorney-client privilege." 35 The term "secret," however, is more broadly defined as including information giined in the professional relationship, "the disclosure
of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to
'36
the client."
The relationship between the duty of confidentiality and the duty
owed by an attorney to the court intersect at DR 4-101(C)(3), which
states that a lawyer may reveal "[t]he intention of his client to commit a
crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."' 37 Like Canon 37,38 this provision does not require disclosure but merely authorizes it. Where disclosure would necessarily reveal a client "confidence"
or "secret," the client's interest in confidentiality arguably overrides
any duty to the court. Moreover, as indicated in the discussion of Canon 37,39 the less risky and more attractive choice for an attorney is to
preserve the client's confidence or secret, thereby avoiding scrutiny of
the lawyer's decision and an embarrassing confrontation with the client.
The Model Code does, however, impose a number of mandatory
duties upon attorneys, designed to protect the integrity of the judicial
process. For instance, the Model Code states that a lawyer shall not
"[k]nowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence."4 Similarly, the
Model Code provides that a lawyer shall not "[c]ounsel or assist his
client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent. 41
On their face, these mandatory provisions arguably prevent an attorney
from asking a client questions that she knows will produce false testimony, and, if the client commits perjury, arguably prohibit the attorney
from referring to the testimony in final argument.
The most troublesome Model Code provision for advocates of
"

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

34 Id.

DR 4-101.

35 Id. DR 4-101 (A).
36 Id.

3- Id.

DR 4-101(C)(3).

See
39 See
40 Id.
41 Id.

supra note 29 and accompanying text.
supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
DR 4-102(A)(4).
DR 7-102(A)(7).

38

(1981).
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strict confidentiality is, however, DR 7-102(B)(1), an unqualified
mandatory provision that states that a lawyer who receives information
"clearly establishing" that her client has perpetrated a fraud "shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal" if the client refuses or
is unable to rectify the situation."2 If the lawyer's knowledge that the
client has committed a fraud is based on client confidences or secrets,
mandatory disclosure of the fraud, apparently required by DR 7102(B)(1), would tend to eviscerate DR 4-101 because disclosure
"would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the
client."4
In 1974, The ABA House of Delegates amended DR 7-102(B)(1)
by adding the words "except when the information is protected as a
privileged communication.""' This new provision, however, did little to
clarify the situation. If "privileged communication" refers to the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, a lawyer with a client who has committed perjury could be under an obligation to disclose the crime, since
attorney-client privilege does not include any expressed intention of a
client to commit a crime. 45 If the term "privileged communication" is
defined broadly, however, to include "secrets" as the term is employed
in DR 4-101, disclosure would be prohibited because revealing the
fraud would "be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to
the client."

46

The ABA addressed the scope of the term "privileged communication" in the 1974 amendment one year later in Formal Opinion 341.'
This Opinion takes the position that the term "privileged communication" includes not simply confidences covered by the attorney-client
privilege but also client secrets. 4 8 While recognizing the conflicting duties to reveal fraud and preserve confidences, the Opinion states that "it
is clear that there has long been an accommodation in favor of preserv42

Id. DR 7-102(B)(1).

3 Id. DR 4-101(A).

44 Id. DR 7-102(B)(1) (1981); see Fried, supra note 30, at 494.
4' A number of authorities hold that the duty of confidentiality imposed by the

attorney-client privilege does not extend to prospective criminal or fraudulent conduct
by the client. See, United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 975 (5th Cir. 1975);
Sawyer v. Barczak, 229 F.2d 805, 808-09 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 351 U.S. 966
(1956); United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1939); Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298, 306
(Iowa 1978); In re Selser, 15 N.J. 393, 407-08, 105 A.2d 395, 399-400 (1954); State v.
Phelps, 24 Or. App. 329, 332, 545 P.2d 901, 904 (1976); C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 229-31 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
46 MODEL, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

DR 4-101(A) (1981).

47 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341

(1975).
4

See id.
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ing confidences either through practice or interpretation."4 9 According
to the Opinion, the "tradition" that permits a lawyer to assure a client
that information (whether a secret or confidence) given to him will not
be revealed to third parties is "so important that it should take precedence, in all but the most serious cases, over the duty imposed by DR
7-102(B).1 50 The Opinion further notes, "[A]n interpretation of the

1974 amendment which would limit its scope to the attorney-client
privilege as it exists in each jurisdiction and under the Federal Rules of
Evidence is undesirable because the lawyer's ethical duty would depend
upon the rules of evidence in a particular jurisdiction.""1
Formal Opinion 341's construction of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility is consistent with Formal Opinion 287,2 which
interpreted the Canons of Professional Conduct. Advocates of client
confidentiality thus find support for their position in formal ABA interpretations of ambiguous ethical standards, promulgated prior to the
adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983.
3.

Draft Standards Relating to the Prosecution and Defense
Function

A faction of the ABA believed that lawyers should be provided
with more explicit guidance than that offered by the Model Code. In
1971, the ABA's House of Delegates approved a draft of Standards
Relating to the Prosecution and the Defense Function that contained a
provision directly addressing the client perjury problem.5" This provision, as amended to Standard 4-7.7 of the Standards for Criminal Justice, provides that an attorney faced with a client intent on perjury may
seek to withdraw, if feasible." If withdrawal is not possible and the
client insists on testifying, the attorney must allow the defendant to take
the stand. If, however, a defendant takes the stand against her attorney's advice, the attorney should make a record of that fact in an appropriate manner, but without revealing her disapproval to the court. 5
Standard 4-7.7 further directs the lawyer to avoid any direct examination of her client that the lawyer believes will induce false testimony.
Instead, an attorney should simply ask the witness if she wishes to
49
50

Id.

Id.

51 Id.

11 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.

"

FENSE
54
55

See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DE-

FUNCTION, Defense Function

See

§ 7.7 (Approved Draft 1971).
§ 4-7.7(b) (2d ed. 1980).

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE

See id. § 4-7.7(c).
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make an additional statement to the factfinder. In closing argument, the
lawyer may not recite or rely on the perjured testimony.5 6 Known as
the "free narrative" solution to the client perjury problem,57 this approach amounts to an uneasy compromise between the officer of the
court and alter ego models.
The free narrative approach has always been controversial. It is
arguably detrimental to the client because it telegraphs to the jury that
the defendant's counsel does not credit her client's testimony. Moreover,
many defendants find it difficult to testify without the benefit of counsel's structured questioning. The proposed standard does, however, give
attorneys clear guidance with respect to what they should do when
faced with a client determined to commit perjury. Although Standard
4-7.7 was approved by the ABA Standing Committee on Association
Standards for Criminal Justice, it was withdrawn in 1979 prior to submission to the ABA House of Delegates, apparently in anticipation of
the Report of the Special Commission on Professional Standards (the
Kutak Commission), which had been created by the House of Delegates in 1977.58

4.

Model Rules of Professional Conduct

No doubt influenced by the role of lawyers in the Watergate scandal and the eroding public confidence in the legal profession, in 1983
the ABA responded to the Kutak Commission by promulgating its
long-awaited Model Rules of Professional Conduct.5 9 The Rules reject
the "free narrative" compromise of Standard 4-7.7, and appear to extend the mandatory obligations of a lawyer beyond those contained in
the Model Code. Model Rule 1.16(b)(1) states that a lawyer may withdraw if her client "persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's
services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent."' Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) further provides, however, that a lawyer
must take "reasonable remedial measures" if a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity."' Most importantly, if
the lawyer has offered false evidence, the duty to take "reasonable remedial measures" applies (at least until the conclusion of the proceeding) even if compliance leads to disclosure of information otherwise
8 See id.
See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 4, at 827.
58 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-7.7 editorial note.
See
80
61

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Id. Rule 1.16(b)(1).
Id. Rule 3.3(a)(4).

(1987).
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considered confidential.6 2 This Rule on its face produces results that
contrast sharply with outcomes under Formal Opinion 341 and Formal
Opinion 287 which construe previous ABA ethical standards. 3
By imposing a mandatory duty on a lawyer to take "reasonable
remedial measures" when false testimony has been offered, the Model
Rules represent the first unambiguous endorsement by the ABA of the
officer of the court approach to the client perjury problem. But by employing the nonspecific phrase "reasonable remedial measures," the
Rules recognize that remedial action should be tailored to the facts and
circumstances of each case. While there is flexibility as to remedy, a
lawyer has an affirmative duty under the Model Rules to prevent client
perjury from tainting the courtroom factfinding process.
The Model Rules, however, did not entirely resolve the conflict
between advocates of strict attorney-client confidentiality and those who
emphasize the attorney's obligation to the courts. The comment to
Model Rule 3.3 notes that if disclosure by a lawyer to prevent a fraud
upon the court constitutes a violation of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel, then the
obligation of the advocate under the Rules would be subordinate to the
such rights.6 4 The fundamental question posed in Nix v. Whiteside:65
was the closely related question of whether any federal constitutional
requirements 6 would prevent imposition of criminal sanctions where
an attorney threatened to disclose client perjury to the court.67
Most states have not adopted the Model Rules, but instead continue to use rules of professional responsibility that closely follow the
Model Code promulgated in 1969. As a result, in most jurisdictions the
ambiguities of the Model Code remain. The Model Rules, however,
have been adopted in varying versions by a number of states.6 8 In Iowa,
the jurisdiction involved in Nix v. Whiteside, the state code of professional responsibility was patterned after the Model Code. 69
62

See id. Rule 3.3(b).

63 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.

" See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (1987).
-6 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
66 The question of whether due process or right to counsel provisions in state
constitutions prevent disclosure of secrets or confidences in order to avoid perjury is a
question of state law not addressed in Whiteside.
'7 See Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 166-71.
68 See id. at 167 n.4.
e See IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS, Preliminary Statement (1987).
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Potential Constitutional Constraints on State Ethical Standards

Three constitutional restraints arguably limit the authority of
states to fashion rules of professional responsibility for lawyers in criminal cases: the sixth amendment right to counsel in criminal cases, applied to state criminal proceedings through the fourteenth amendment;
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; and a constitutionally-based right to testify arguably found in the shadows of the fifth,
sixth and fourteenth amendments."0
1. The Sixth Amendment "Right to Counsel"
Ever since the outrageous Scottsboro case" x in the early days of the
Depression, a criminal defendant in a state prosecution has had the
right to the "guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him."17 In the intervening years, the Supreme Court has struggled to define the precise point at which denial of the right to counsel
or right to effective counsel will prevent the state from imposing criminal sanctions against a defendant.
a.

Right to the Presence of Counsel at Critical Stages of the
CriminalJustice Process

The Supreme Court has held in a number of cases that the right
to counsel extends to specific stages of the criminal justice process. A
criminal defendant, for instance, has a sixth amendment right to counProfessor Freedman also sees fifth amendment implications. See Freedman, Client Confidences and Client Perjury: Some Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REv.
1939, 1946-55 (1988). A lawyer who simply informs the court that her client intends to
commit perjury does not, however, violate the fifth amendment rights of her client,
since the communication is not used by the state as evidence of criminal liability in the
pending proceeding, but is simply revealed to the court in order to prevent a future
crime from occurring.
Furthermore, if the client elects to take the stand, the communication probably can
be used to impeach the client's testimony without violating the fifth amendment. The
notion that probative but otherwise inadmissable evidence may be used against a defendant once the defendant takes the stand is well-established. See Jenkins v. Anderson,
447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) (prearrest silence used to impeach defendant who elected to
testify); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (statement inadmissable under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), nevertheless admissable to impeach defendant). Counsel would of course be required to withdraw if she were called by the state to
testify against her client.
A serious fifth amendment problem would arise, however, if the defendant did not
take the stand, and the state nonetheless attempted to compel a lawyer to reveal communications suggesting that the client proposed to commit perjury at trial.
71 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
70

72

Id. at 69.
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sel on request during interrogations while in police custody73 and when
determining her plea,74 and a right to consult with counsel during trial
testimony.7 5 These cases provide the accused with procedural rather
than substantive protection. They do not mandate any particular behavior by counsel, but simply ensure that counsel has an opportunity to
participate in critical stages of the criminal process. In the context of
client perjury, these "critical stage" cases become important when local
ethical rules prohibiting a lawyer from assisting in the perpetration of a
fraud upon the courts force a defendant to take the stand and testify
without the assistance of counsel. 6
b. Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
The Supreme Court has also held that the sixth amendment requires that each criminal defendant be provided "effective assistance of
counsel" in the presentation of her defense. 7 This overarching concept
defies precise definition and tends to be case-specific. The requirement
of effective assistance of counsel is obviously not designed as a constitutional insurance policy to provide a defendant with relief simply because a particular strategy backfires. On the other hand, counsel bungling a case through ignorance of the law or slothful investigation
directly offends the values behind the sixth amendment right to counsel.
In Strickland v. Washington"8 the Court established a twopronged test to determine whether ineffective assistance of counsel invalidated a conviction. First, a criminal defendant must show that counsel provided assistance "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. '79 Second, the defendant must demonstrate actual
prejudice as a result of counsel's deficient performance.8" Unless both
prongs of the Strickland test are satisfied, a lawyer found to have violated a local rule of ethics dealing with client perjury will not have
rendered ineffective assistance.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-74 (1966).
See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 59-60 (1963).
71 See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976).
71 Cf United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102, 1108 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing
testimony without the assistance of counsel when attorney testified against client who
had accused him of coercing plea bargain).
7 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
7"

78 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
79 Id. at 690.
81 See id. at 692.
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c. The Right to Independent (Conflict-Free) Counsel
A third strand of the sixth amendment right to counsel states that
a criminal defendant is entitled to a lawyer who is not saddled with
conflicts of interest, a risk inherent in the joint representation of multiple defendants. A conflict may, for instance, prevent an attorney from
arguing "the relative involvement and culpability of his clients in order
to minimize the culpability of one by emphasizing that of another."8 "
The Supreme Court has held that "whenever a trial court improperly
requires joint representation over timely objection, reversal is automatic." 2 No demonstration of prejudice was required because it would
be difficult, or virtually impossible, to assess the impact of a conflict on
an attorney's representation of her client."3 The Court has more recently elaborated that if no objection is raised at trial, the defendant
"must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected
his lawyer's performance." 4
By either strand of logic, it could be argued that an attorney who
believes she must disclose client confidences to a tribunal in order to
avoid professional sanctions cannot give her client the undivided loyalty
required by the sixth amendment.8 5 According to such a view, because
the attorney has a conflict of interest between maintaining her professional reputation and representing her client effectively, the court
should presume prejudice. Applying the conflict of interest rationale to
the client perjury setting would in effect constitutionally mandate a
strict confidentiality approach to the client perjury problem.
2.

Due Process Issues

In some circumstances, the client perjury dilemma may also present questions of fundamental fairness. The leading case is Lowery v.
Cardwell.86 In Lowery, a defense attorney sought to withdraw when
his client insisted on taking the stand. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals understandably believed that the attorney's action communicated
" Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) (citing Glasser v. U.S., 315
U.S. 60 (1942)).
82

83

Id. at 488.

See id. at 490-91.
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).

85 See Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1327-31 (8th Cir. 1984); ef. United
States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102, 1107-09 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that by testifying
against his client, an attorney denied the client effective assistance of counsel, even
though his testimony was aimed at rebutting allegations that he had coerced a guilty
plea, an action that "would be tantamount to malpractice").

88 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
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to the factfinder his belief that his client was about to testify falsely.8"
When the defendant's own lawyer expressly or implicitly calls his own
client a perjurer in front of the factfinder, the impact is likely to be
highly prejudicial. Juries (and judges) tend to convict perjurers even
where the evidence is less than overwhelming.
All this, of course, does not necessarily imply that the attorney in
Lowery acted improperly. Indeed, the lawyer's actions may have complied with both the letter and spirit of local rules of ethics. Instead, the
argument is the defendant's conviction cannot survive because her lawyer's actions, however justified by local rules of ethics, deprived her of
her constitutional rights at trial. Under some circumstances, a lawyer
maybe ethically bound to take actions that will inevitably result in a
mistrial.
3.

Right to Testify

A third constitutional theory implicated in client perjury cases is
what has been called the right to testify on one's own behalf.8 Some
have contended that the right is implicit in the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments. Stripped to its bare essentials, the arguement that
the right of a criminal defendant to take the stand and tell her side of
the story is so fundamental that no lawyer should be allowed to prevent
or deter the client from doing so.
If there is a constitutional right to testify, it is the result not of
historic practice, but of the evolution of constitutional doctrine. For the
first hundred years of constitutional interpretation, the dilemma posed
by a client determined to commit perjury did not arise, because the law
held that criminal defendants were incompetent witnesses in criminal
proceedings. 8 This practice reflected the English common law rule that
the accused had no right to take the stand. In part, the policy was based
upon a fear that if courts granted a right to testify, such a practice
would unduly cast doubt on a defendant who declined to testify.Y0
87

See id. at 729-30.

See, e.g., Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1329-30 (8th Cir. 1984) (counsel's
threat to discontinue representation of client and testify against him should he perjure
himself compromised client's constitutional right to testify in his own defense); United
States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir.) (trial court's ruling that defendant
could not testify to a duress defense to which he was not entitled as a matter of law did
not deprive defendant of his constitutional right to testify) , cert. denied 461 U.S. 931
(1983); Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 923-25 (7th Cir. 1982) (trial court's application of state alibi-notice statute unconstitutionally deprived defendant of his right to
testify and present a defense).
89 See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 574-77 (1961).
80 See id. at 578-9.
88
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Courts and legislators also assumed that the accused would testify
falsely to advance her trial prospects." 1 Only after the Civil War did
the states begin passing competency statutes that allowed criminal defendants to testify on their own behalfY2 In 1878, Congress enacted a
federal statute establishing the right of a defendant to testify in federal
criminal cases.9 3
The Supreme Court has never expressly recognized a constitutional right to testify. In Ferguson v. Georgia,94 the Court held that if
a state allows a criminal defendant to take the stand in her own defense, then it must allow the defendant's lawyer to assist in the presentation. Under Ferguson, a state cannot limit the defendant's testimony
to a potentially rambling, confusing statement while her lawyer sits
helplessly at the counsel table, unable to assist her client by asking
questions that would give a logical structure to her testimony.
A constitutional right to testify could prevent expansion to the client perjury setting of holdings that a lawyer may deny her client's wish
to call certain witnesses to the stand because the lawyer believes they
will present perjured testimony.9 5 Similarly, a lawyer's threat to withdraw over a client's potential perjury could potentially "chill" the exercise of the right to testify. 6
II. THE HOLDING IN Nix v. Whiteside
With the ethical and constitutional issues outlined above in mind,
this Part examines Nix v. Whiteside.9 7 After a brief review of the case's
background, its precise holding will be analyzed.
A.

Background

Emmanuel Charles Ray Whiteside was convicted of second-degree
murder for a homicide committed in the apartment of an acquaintance
91
92

See id. at 573-74.
See id. at 577 n.6.
Act of Mar. 16, 1878, ch.37, 20 Stat. 30 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.

§ 3481 (1982)).
94 365 U.S. 571, 596 (1961).
95 See People v. Williams, 2 Cal.3d 894, 905, 471 P.2d 1008, 1015, 88 Cal. Rptr.
208, 215 (1970) (en banc) ("Whether to call certain witnesses is generally a matter of
trial tactics" as to which "[an attorney may ordinarily waive his client's rights."); People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 11 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) ("[C]ounsel was correct in
refusing to call the witnesses which the defendant located to support his spurious defense of alibi.").
98 See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 120-121 (3d Cir.
1977) (defendant should not be forced to choose between his right to testify and his
right to counsel).
97 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
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of his, Calvin Love. On the night of the homicide, Whiteside and Love
argued over drugs, and Whiteside stabbed Love to death. There were
two eyewitnesses, including Love's girlfriend.98
Whiteside originally told his court-appointed attorneys that Love
had been reaching for a gun beneath a pillow when Whiteside stabbed
him. Whiteside stated that he had not actually seen a gun, but had
thought he had seen one, and was convinced that Love had had one
because Love had a reputation for carrying guns.9 The eyewitnesses
also had not seen a gun, and a police search of the apartment shortly
after the homicide did not uncover a weapon. A week before the trial,
however, Whiteside altered his version of the facts. He now told his
attorneys for the first time that he had actually seen "something metallic" in Love's hand. When his attorneys questioned his change of story,
Whiteside declared "'[I]n Howard Cook's case there was a gun. If I
don't say I saw a gun, I'm dead.'

"10

Whiteside's change of story startled his attorneys, but more importantly, it provoked a strong admonition from lead defense counsel, who
did not believe Whiteside's revised account. The attorney told Whiteside that if he, Whiteside, was set on testifying that he actually saw a
gun in Love's hands, he would not be permitted to perjure himself. The
lawyer testified:
[W]e could not allow him to [testify falsely] because that
would be perjury, and as officers of the court we would be
suborning perjury if we allowed him to do it

. ..

I advised

him that if he did do that it would be my duty to advise the
Court of what he was doing and that I felt he was committing perjury; also, that I probably would be allowed to impeach that particular testimony.1 '
Counsel also indicated they would seek to withdraw if he insisted on
testifying that he actually saw "something metallic."' 0 2
Nothing further was said about the perjury issue, and at the time
of trial, Whiteside took the stand and testified that although he had not
actually seen a weapon, he had thought Love was armed, because Love
98 See id. at 160.
11 Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d at 1325.
100 Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 160-61 (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app.
F at A85, Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (No. 84-1321) [hereinafter Pet. app.
F] (portion of defense attorney's testimony at hearing on supplemental motion for new
trial).
101Id. at 161 (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 100, at A85
(portions of defense attorney's testimony at hearing on supplemental motion for new
trial)).
102

Id.
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had a reputation for carrying guns, and because during the argument,
Love told his girlfriend to "give him his 'piece.' "lo3 The jury convicted
Whiteside of second-degree murder.'0 4
After his conviction, Whiteside discharged his attorneys and filed a
posttrial motion alleging that they had improperly coerced him into altering his testimony. The state trial court, after hearing testimony from
Whiteside and his attorneys, entered a conclusory order denied the motion.which based on the facts as presented by Whiteside's attorneys.' 05
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in a brief opinion.10 8 Without engaging in extensive constitutional analysis, the Court
held that the attorneys had "good cause to believe" that Whiteside's
"proposed testimony would be deliberately untruthful."'' 0 7 The court
quoted Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers DR 4101(C)(3), that, following the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, states "'[A] lawyer may reveal the intention of his client to
commit a crime.' "'08 The Court further cited, among other provisions,
Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(4), prohibits an
attorney from knowingly using perjured testimony.' 0 9 The Court concluded its analysis by commending the attorneys for "the high ethical
manner" in which they handled the matter." 0
When Whiteside filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court,
the district court denied the petition, simply accepting what it characterized as the state court's factual finding that Whiteside had intended
to testify falsely. The district court reasoned that Whiteside was not
entitled to relief because there was no constitutional right to perjure
oneself."'
Id. at 178 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Appendix at
66-67, State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1978) (No. 61091), reprinted in
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 100, at A55-A56)) (defendant's trial testimony). For a transcript of shorthand notes of the state district court trial, State v.
Whiteside, CRF No. 3199-0277 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Linn County May 12, 1977), see
Joint Appendix at 3, Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (No. 86-1321) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
104 See Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 160.
10. State v. Whiteside, CRF No. 3199-0277(Iowa Dist. Ct., Linn County 1977)
(ruling on supplemental motion for new trial and order setting sentencing), reprinted
in Joint Appendix, supra note 103, at 56.
106See State v.- Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1978).
10

107

Id. at 471.

Id. (quoting an earlier version of Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers DR 4-101(C)(3) (1987) (emphasis added)).
109See Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers DR 7-102(A)(4)
108

(1987).
110State

v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d at 471.
"I1See Whiteside v. Scurr, Civ. No. 81-246-C, slip. op. at 2-3 (S.D. Iowa Dec. 7,

1982).
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The Eighth Circuit disagreed.11 2 It accepted, as had the district
court, what it characterized as the Iowa Supreme Court's factual determination that Whiteside had intended to testify falsely. It held, however, that Whiteside's attorneys had deprived Whiteside of effective assistance of counsel, due process of law, and his constitutional right,
based on the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments, to testify on his
own behalf."1
The Eighth Circuit discussion properly began with the observation
that its analysis "does not deal with the ethical problem" faced by
Whiteside's lawyers.11 4 Regarding this ethical question, the court recognized that the proper approach to client perjury is "a very controversial
matter," and commended the lawyers for "conscientiously attempting to
address the problem of client perjury in a manner consistent with professional responsibility."1 15 The only concerns of the court, however,
were the constitutional questions posed by the case.
In its sixth amendment analysis, the Eight Circuit noted that
"[c]ounsel's ability to serve as an effective advocate . . . depends upon
the defendant's ability to disclose information fully and in confidence to
counsel." 116 The court argued that, as with unnecessary disclosure of
client confidences, the threat of disclosure "'creates a chilling effect
which inhibits the mutual trust and independence necessary to effective
representation.' "I" In particular, the court rejected the suggestion that
Whiteside's lawyer could testify against him if he insisted upon committing perjury. At this point, according to the court, counsel became a
potential adversary rather than a zealous advocate.11 8 Relying ulti1 9 the court of appeals held that, given
mately on Cuyler v. Sullivan,"
the conflict of interest between counsel and client, prejudice would be
20
presumed.1
The court further held that the actions of Whiteside's attorneys
compromised Whiteside's constitutional right to testify in his own defense. According to the court, Whiteside's lawyers, by forcing him to
112

113
114
115

116

See Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984).
See id. at 1328-29.
Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1327-28.
Id. at 1329.

117 Id. (quoting United States ex rel: Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d
Cir. 1977)).

-8

See id.

3 9 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980) ("In order to establish a violation of the Sixth
Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an
actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.") For a discussion of the right to conflict-free counsel, see supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
110 See Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d at 1330.
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choose between his right to testify and his right to effective assistance of
1 21
counsel, infringed both.
B.

The Majority Opinion in Nix v. Whiteside

Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Whiteside began its
sixth amendment analysis with a relatively straightforward application
of Strickland v. Washington112 standards. The Court noted that to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a party must show
that "'counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.' "123
The Court emphasized that in reviewing attorney conduct,
a court must be careful not to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively
as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional
conduct and thereby intrude into the state's proper authority
to define and apply the standards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to practice in its courts."2
As Professors Hazard and Hodes have observed, the issue in Whiteside
was "not whether counsel was right, but whether counsel was radically
wrong"1 25 when he admonished Whiteside.
In order to determine whether the conduct of Whiteside's attorneys
was a constitutionally acceptable response to proposed client perjury,
the Court examined various ethical standards, from the 1908 Canons of
Professional Ethics to the 1983 Model Rules,' 2 6-which, as noted
above, 12' appear to authorize, though do not require, an attorney to
take vigorous action to prevent client perjury. In light of these standards, the Court stated that the conduct of Whiteside's lawyers fell
"well within accepted standards of professional conduct and the range
' 28
of reasonable professional conduct acceptable under Strickland."'
The majority treated Whiteside's due process and right to testify
claims with similar dispatch. The majority did not provide any due
process analysis, but emphasized the peculiar facts of the case which
made it possible to avoid due process problems. The majority noted, for
121

122
123

124

121

See id. at 1329-30.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 165 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

Id. at 165.
G. HAZARD

& W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE

360.1 (Supp. 1987).
See Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 166-70.
See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 171.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
128
127
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example, that no client confidences were divulged until Whiteside's
posttrial motions."2 9 Thus, by implication at least, the situation
presented in Whiteside was different from that in Lowery v. Cardwell,' 30 in which the trial itself was tainted because the fact finder
knew that the accused's own lawyer believed that his client had committed perjury. In a footnote, the Court also observed that the record in
Whiteside did not support the allegation that Whiteside's attorneys
threatened to testify against Whiteside while still acting as his counsel. 3 ' Any potential testimony from Whiteside's lawyers would have
occurred after they had withdrawn, thereby avoiding the fundamentally
unfair situation in which an attorney serves as both defense lawyer and
prosecution witness at the same time.
The majority did not directly address the existence of a constitutional right to testify. The majority noted, however, that whatever the
scope of a constitutional right to testify, there was no constitutional
right to testify falsely.' 3 2 Just as "[a] defendant who informed his counsel that he was arranging to bribe or threatening witnesses or members
of the jury would have no 'right' to insist on counsel's assistance or
silence," so, too, a client who intends to commit perjury cannot hide
behind the shield of an attorney's duty of confidentiality.' 3
The majority also briefly addressed the issue of whether prejudice
under Strickland should be presumed when a "conflict" exists between
a client who wishes to offer perjured testimony and a lawyer who seeks
to follow ethical rules.' 34 The majority opinion reasoned that the rationale of the conflict-of-interest cases does not apply when an attorney
simply seeks to prevent a client from engaging in illegal acts. To hold
otherwise would mean "every guilty criminal's conviction would be suspect if the defendant had sought to obtain an acquittal by illegal
135
means."'
The majority opinion is not without its flaws. It is clearly overwritten in several places. For instance, the observation that "[n]o system of justice worthy of the name can tolerate a lesser standard" than
mandatory disclosure 3 ' is a gratuitous comment that would certainly
See id. at 172.
575 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that because defense counsel communicated to fact finder his belief that client committed perjury, fact finder was disabled from judging the merits of defendant's defense).
i See Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 172 n.7.
132 See id. at 173.
133Id. at 174.
134 See id. at 175-76.
135 Id. at 176.
136 Id. at 174.
129

130
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startle the authors of Formal Opinion 287 and Formal Opinion 341.
As Justice Brennan noted in his concurring opinion, "[Tihe Court's
essay regarding what constitutes the correct response to a criminal client's suggestion that he will perjure himself is pure discourse without
force of law.""3"
The Court also did not address troublesome issues surrounding the
fact finding process in the case. The majority simply assumed that a
conclusive factual determination had been made that Whiteside intended to testify falsely. 3 While the unusual record in Whiteside supports that conclusion,' 40 it is not clear what standard a constitutional
tribunal should apply to determine whether a client intends to commit
perjury. The Iowa Supreme Court, for instance, stated that Whiteside's
lawyers had "good cause to believe" that their client planned to commit
perjury. 4 Is a "good cause" standard that is apparently deferential to
a lawyer's judgment constitutionally sufficient? One could argue that a
lawyer's determination that she "knows" the client intends to testify
falsely should be reviewed under deferential Strickland v. Washington
standards. In the alternative, should a trial court make an independent,
de novo determination that the client was preparing to testify falsely?
But would not any such procedure unduly invade the province of the
142
jury in a criminal case?
While the Court's opinion did not settle these important issues,
they were clearly on the minds of some Justices at oral argument. The
second question addressed to the state's counsel during oral argument
asked what standard should be employed before a lawyer has a professional obligation to take action to prevent perjured testimony. 43 The
state's counsel took the position that an attorney must not act on mere
137See supra notes 31-32, 47-52 and accompanying text.
118 Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 177 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). It is
worth noting that the four concurring justices relied solely on the lack of prejudice in
the record in affirming Whiteside's conviction. They seemed reluctant to consider the
difficult questions presented by the case. See id at 178, 184-88 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
139 After stating that "[tihe Court of Appeals assumed for the purpose of the decision that Whiteside would have given false testimony had counsel not intervened," the
Court continued: "We see this as a case in which the attorney successfully dissuaded
the client from committing the crime of perjury." Id. at 171-72.
140 Whiteside's statement that "in Howard Cook's case there was a gun. If I don't
say I saw a gun, I'm dead," id. at 161, when contrasted with Whiteside's earlier repetitive statements that he did not actually see a gun, see id. at 160, amounts to a direct
admission that the defendant was contemplating perjury.
141 State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Iowa 1978).
142 See Appel, Nix v. Whiteside: The Role of Apples, Oranges, and the Great
Houdini in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 23 CRIm. L. BULL. 5, 14-16 (1987).
143 See Official Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157
(1986) (No. 84-1321) [hereinafter Transcript].
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suspicion, but must "know" or "know beyond a reasonable doubt" that
the client intended to commit perjury.""' The Court apparently believed
that the appropriate standard of judicial review, whatever it might be,
was met under the facts and circumstances of the case.
C.

The Limitations of Nix v. Whiteside

Whiteside presented what one commentator has called "one of the
easier client perjury scenarios." 1 45 Because the lawyer's admonition in
Whiteside had the desired affect, no perjury occurred at trial. Thus, the
case did not present what Justice Stevens characterized as "much more
difficult questions of what a lawyer must, should, or may do after his
client has given testimony that the lawyer does not believe."14 6 The
success of the admonition also avoided the troublesome situation in
which the judge or jury, either expressly or implicitly, knows that the
attorney believes her own client is lying. Moreover, Whiteside did not
present a case in which the lawyer refused to allow the client to take
the stand altogether, a scenario that in some contexts may raise more
serious right-to-testify questions. In addition, Whiteside did not present
a situation in which a client is without counsel at a critical stage because her attorney either withdraws or refuses to assist in the presentation of perjured testimony.
Perhaps most important, in Whiteside the client virtually told the
lawyer that he intended to commit perjury at trial: "If I don't say I saw
a gun, I'm dead" was his justification for his new testimony.14 7 Justice
White at oral argument characterized Whiteside as "a relatively rare
148
case" in which the defendant's clearly intended to commit perjury.
Plainly, Whiteside has no application when a lawyer merely suspects
that a client may be about to testify falsely. If a defendant is unable to
testify because her lawyer refuses to put her on the stand on mere suspicion that her testimony may be false, the defendant's rights to testify
and to due process rights may well have been violated.
III.

IMPACT OF

Nix v. Whiteside

Thus far, this Article has argued that the main thrust of Nix v.
144

Id.

145 Note, Nix v. Whiteside: Is a Client's Intended PerjuryA Real Dilemma?, 22

TULSA L.J. 399, 422 (1987).
141 Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 191 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
147 Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 161 (quoting Petition for aWrit of Certiorari app. F,
supra note 100, at A85).
14

Transcript, supra note 143, at 58.
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Whiteside149 is that, as the Supreme Court saw the facts, the actions of
Whiteside's attorneys were constitutionally permissible. Each state
must decide how best to address the client perjury problem presented in
Whiteside. A state may adopt either the "free narrative" approach of
the Standards, 150 or the strict confidentiality ("alter ego") approach1 51
without constitutional restraints. Similarly, a state could impose upon
lawyers the apparently mandatory obligations of the Model Rules
without offending constitutional values in a factual context similar to
Whiteside.
A.

Subsequent Judicial Decisions

Unfortunately, since Whiteside, courts have not consistently recognized the distinction between a state's regulation of its lawyers' ethical
conduct and constitutional restraints upon the conviction of an accused.
For instance, in United States v. Carbone,1 52 the First Circuit, citing
Whiteside, offered the sweeping observation that "[tihe Supreme Court
has declared unequivocally that the attorney-client privilege does not
cover the commission of perjury."' 53 Whiteside, however, only stands
for the proposition that the sixth amendment does not require states to
recognize an attorney-client privilege that would protect from disclosure
the expressed intention of a client to commit perjury in state criminal
proceedings. States remain free to adopt a broader attorney-client
privilege.
Furthermore, a number of courts seem to believe that the Court in
Whiteside delineated the scope of a lawyer's ethical obligations when
faced with a client intending to commit perjury. For instance, the
Ninth Circuit in In re Curl.. at least implies that Whiteside stands for
the duty of a lawyer never to put on the witness stand a client she has
reason to know is committing perjury. Similarly, the court in Herbster
1 55
v. North American Co. of Life and Health Insurance
cited Whiteside for the proposition that "[w]ithdrawal from representation is not
only an appropriate response but may be mandated for an attorney
when the client threatens to commit a crime. '1 5 6 Also, the court in
475 U.S. 157 (1986).
See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
'5' See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
152 798 F.2d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 1986).
153 Id. at 28.
15 803 F.2d 1004, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1986).
155 150 II.App.3d 21, 501 N.E.2d 343 (1986), appeal denied, 114 Ill.2d 545, 508
N.E.2d 728 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 150 (1987).
156 Id. at 29, 501 N.E.2d at 348.
149
150
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State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assoc. v. Cantre11157 cited Whiteside to
support its view that there was "no basis" for any sanction less than
158
disbarment when a lawyer suborned perjury.
A court can, of course, cite Whiteside if it finds its reasoning on
legal ethics persuasive. But the Court in Whiteside did not determine
state legal ethics. Indeed, some states that have adopted the Model
Rules have eliminated or modified their provisions in order to avoid
9
requiring the disclosure of a client's intent to commit perjury.5
B.

Impact on the Attorney-Client Relationship

Because of Whiteside's limited holding, the decision rarely has a
direct impact on criminal defense attorneys and their clients. Although
Whiteside strips away federal constitutional arguments against disclosure of a client's intent to commit perjury, several requirements nonetheless must be satisfied before a criminal defense lawyer has an affirmative duty to disclose a client's intended perjury.
First, the lawyer must be practicing in a jurisdiction that requires
disclosure of intended perjury if necessary to prevent a fraud upon the
court. As indicated above, not all local rules of ethics, as interpreted by
authoritative state tribunals, impose such a requirement. In addition to
local ethical rules, a lawyer must examine provisions of state constitutions, as interpreted by state supreme courts, in order to determine
whether they conflict with, and therefore override, local ethical
prescritions.
Second, even if a lawyer practices in a jurisdiction in which the
local law appears to require a lawyer to take affirmative action to prevent client perjury, such duties generally arise only when an attorney
"knows" that the client intends to testify falsely. Only rarely will a
lawyer know both that proposed testimony is false and that the client is
determined to offer the false testimony at trial.1 6 0
Third, even when the attorney "knows" that a client's suggested
testimony is false, she should first try remedies short of disclosure that
may satisfy her ethical obligations. An attorney may be able to withdraw from representation, although such a "solution" might simply
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734 P.2d 1292 (Okla. 1987).

Id. at 1293.
See Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 61:404-405 (1988) (citing
rules in New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Washington that eliminate or modify a lawyer's duty to disclose client perjury).
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'60 See Freedman, The Aftermath of Nix v. Whiteside: Slamming the Lid on Pandora'sBox, 23 GRIM. L. BULL. 25, 29 (1987). For a discussion of the requirement that
an attorney "know" that a client is prepared to commit, or has committed perjury, see
G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 125, at 339-44 (1985).
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pass the problem on to succeeding counsel. If withdrawal is not allowed, an attorney may nonetheless be able to persuade the client not to
testify. The impact of moral persuasion is admittedly limited, especially
when a defendant stands accused of serious crimes, conviction of which
could result in a long prison term or even the death sentence. Tactical
arguments are likely to be more persuasive. A client who is shown to be
a liar on cross-examination is likely to be convicted even if the evidence
against her is less than overwhelming. Consequently, a lawyer may
sometimes be able to appeal to a client's self-interest in order to prevent
perjury.
The most serious question, however, is not whether Whiteside has
had a direct effect on many criminal cases, but whether states after
Whiteside should adopt mandatory ethical rules, similar to those of the
Model Rules,1"' that require an attorney, after other remedies prove
ineffective, to disclose a client's perjury. Arguably, such a rule makes it
less likely that a client will be totally candid with counsel. Conversely,
attorneys seeking to dodge mandatory duties may attempt to structure
discussions with clients so as to avoid learning "facts." Under either
scenario, client representation could suffer because of the stilted character of attorney-client communications. After Whiteside, however, the
question whether a mandatory disclosure rule similar to Model Rule
3.3 is desirable in client perjury situations is for the states to decide free
from federal constitutional restraints.
CONCLUSION

Nix v. Whiteside stands for the proposition that, under the facts
presented, the actions of Whiteside's attorneys did not violate the
United States Constitution. Whiteside thus removes federal constitutional barriers to state rules of ethics that impose mandatory duties,
including disclosure, upon attorneys who know that their clients plan to
deliberately offer false testimony at trial. Whether such an approach is
sound policy is left for each state to decide.

...See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.

